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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report examines why and how regional powers armed with nuclear weapons may employ those weapons coercively against the United States or U.S. allies during a conventional war. We argue that the problem of intra--war deterrence -preventing nuclear--armed adversaries from escalating during a conventional conflict - is arguably the most important deterrence challenge facing the United States in the 21 st century.
The strategic environment facing the United States, its allies, and its potential adversaries has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For nearly four decades, the United States and its NATO allies planned to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves from a major Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The armies of the Warsaw Pact were perceived to be too formidable to confront with a strictly conventional defense -at least at spending levels that would be acceptable to the North Atlantic alliance.
Nuclear weapons were thus NATO's "trump card": NATO planned to employ nuclear weapons coercively during a war to raise the costs and risks to the Warsaw Pact and thereby convince them to halt their military operations before they could inflict a total defeat on NATO.
Today, the global balance of power is reversed. Now U.S. military forces are the most formidable, and potential U.S. adversaries need trump cards of their own to stalemate the United States. This reversal in the balance of power helps explain why the United States now seeks to delegitimize nuclear weapons and reduce their role in the world.
Unfortunately, the same conditions that once made NATO rely on nuclear weapons will now likely compel other countries -including several potential U.S. adversaries -to rely upon nuclear weapons.
In today's world, relatively weaker adversaries face a range of incentives and options to use nuclear weapons coercively during conventional conflicts. Facing conventionally superior foes, regional nuclear--armed states will worry deeply about the consequences of military defeat. Recent history shows that such defeats are often extraordinarily costly for adversary leadership -as the fate of Manuel Noriega, Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Qaddafi demonstrate so starkly. Therefore, regional adversaries face powerful incentives to employ nuclear weapons coercively to stalemate their opponents before suffering major battlefield defeats and the attendant catastrophic consequences.
The logical appeal of coercive nuclear escalation is well understood by countries around the world. The strategy appears to be reflected in the defense plans and doctrines of key states. Moreover, the countries that appear to have internalized the strategic logic of coercive nuclear escalation are the same ones predicted to do so according to the arguments in this report.
Some conflicts are more likely to escalate than others. Some of the world's nuclear "hotspots" are more dangerous than others. Threats to invade and conquer an adversary and overthrow its regime are obviously the most escalatory, but other kinds of conflicts offer grounds for deep concern. Military campaigns that significantly degrade an adversary's ability to defend itself, military operations that target adversary strategic assets, and conflicts that make regime downfall more likely if the adversary fails to achieve its political objectives all contain the seeds of escalation.
The principal implications of this study for U.S. policy makers can be summarized in five points:
• U.S. adversaries have powerful incentives to use nuclear weapons against the United States during conventional wars. The same logic that led NATO to adopt a strategy of coercive nuclear escalation during the Cold War will likely drive future U.S. adversaries to do the same to stalemate the United States.
• History suggests that most nuclear--armed countries that face overwhelming conventional military threats develop, and rely upon, coercive nuclear doctrines.
• Most of the world's most dangerous conflicts -i.e., those that create the greatest incentives for combatants to use nuclear weapons -involve the United States:
including war on the Korean Peninsula, conflicts in maritime East Asia, and in 4 the future war in the Strait of Hormuz. (The most notable non--U.S. conflict which involves high nuclear escalation risks is India--Pakistan.)
• Because the United States seeks to prevent escalation during conventional wars, regional war planners need to fully integrate the goal of escalation prevention into the foundation of their war plans and conventional concepts of operations (CONOPS). Existing "limited aims" plans may pursue limited objectives without restraining U.S. military operations sufficiently to mitigate escalation risks.
• The challenges of deterring escalation during conventional wars, and assuring allies during those conflicts, place a premium on flexible U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. Proposals regarding the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should assess the proposed force against the challenge of deterring intra--war escalation, and not just the mission of peacetime deterrence.
INTRODUCTION
The most critical question about nuclear weapons in the 21 st century is whether states will ever use them again. Is the possibility of inter--state nuclear war sufficiently plausible to be a major concern? In the coming decades, are there realistic circumstances in which states might choose to use nuclear weapons against enemies, including the United States? In short, might some states be so powerfully motivated to use nuclear weapons that deterrence will fail?
Many analysts would answer each of these questions with a simple "no." According to an increasingly common view, states are unlikely to use nuclear weapons at all, highly unlikely to use them against other states that can retaliate in kind, and extremely unlikely to use them against the United States - the world's preeminent military power. No other act seems as foolhardy. Although U.S. President Barack Obama pledged, in his "global zero" speech in Prague in 2009, that "the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies," most analysts do not believe deterrence is a demanding mission - because the odds of an adversary nuclear attack seem vanishingly small. "To put an end to Cold War thinking," President Obama also proclaimed, "we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." 1 Those analysts who favor further deep cuts to the U.S.
nuclear arsenal commonly make the point that such weapons are stale leftovers from the Cold War. According to this logic, nuclear deterrence is a "legacy" mission. Cold War era nuclear arsenals, strategies, war plans, alert postures, deterrence puzzles, and worst--case scenario planning are relics of a bygone era. 2 Of course, even those analysts who are confident that U.S. adversaries will not use nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies tend to recognize an array of contemporary nuclear dangers. For instance, terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons or (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) . More broadly, many scholars and policy analysts argue that nuclear deterrence - whatever its role in the Cold War - is either unnecessary today or a simple mission because intentional nuclear attack is so unlikely. materials; accidents may lead to unwanted detonations; or states may start inadvertent nuclear war. But none of those dangers can be effectively mitigated through nuclear deterrence strategies. Terrorist acquisition is so terrifying precisely because terrorists are difficult to deter. 3 Accidents cannot be prevented through deterrence. And deterrence is irrelevant to inadvertent war scenarios, which by definition do not result from deliberate decisions for war. The implication is that these nuclear dangers can only be mitigated if nuclear policy is focused, first and foremost, on the goals of non--proliferation, de--legitimization, and eventual abolition. Many in the U.S. national security community acknowledge that nuclear weapons continue to play a residual deterrent role but, they believe that deterrence is straightforward: deterring the deterrable is fairly simple, and deterring the real dangers (terrorism, accidents, and the unintended) is impossible. This is why, for a large and growing portion of mainstream analysts and policymakers, nuclear policy essentially boils down to the goals of non--proliferation and disarmament.
Unfortunately, the increasingly influential perspective in Washington and the broader analytical community rests on a weak understanding of the role that nuclear weapons played during the Cold War, and it therefore overlooks the strategic continuities between the Cold War and the present. When one examines why NATO once relied so heavily on nuclear weapons, the continuities between past and present become clear, and the policies of those countries that are "hold outs" against the global campaign for nuclear arms reductions begin to make sense. In fact, nuclear deterrence will continue to be central to the conduct of international politics, now and long into the future. Moreover, the likelihood of intentional nuclear attacks -even against the United States -is far higher than most scholars and analysts realize. In short, nuclear deterrence is likely to be quite difficult in the foreseeable future.
This report argues that the U.S. policy community has given too little attention to the problem of intra--war nuclear deterrence. Specifically, relatively weak but nuclear--armed This report makes four principal arguments: First, nuclear weapons are just as salient today as they were in the past. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were enormously valuable because one set of countries (members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO) lacked the conventional military power to defend itself from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Nuclear weapons allowed the "weak" side to deter the "strong" one. 5 And had war erupted, nuclear weapons would have given the weak side its best hope of fighting the strong side to a stalemate. 6 The Cold War is over, but the 4 The U.S. Department of Defense's 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) holds that deterrence "is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while… convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome." In many potential conflicts, however, the nature of U.S. desired end--states, the fragility of adversary regimes, the proximity of an adversary's conventional weapons and strategic systems, and the nature of U.S. military doctrine (which is designed to deny the adversary situational awareness) will make it difficult to assure adversaries that their restraint will lead to "acceptable outcomes." Furthermore, it may be difficult to deny adversaries the benefits of nuclear escalation or credibly threaten to impose adequate costs. In short, intra--war deterrence will likely pose daunting challenges for the United States and its partners in the coming years. 5 In this report, "weak" refers to the country (or alliance) that lacks the conventional military power to prevail in a conventional war against its key enemies; "strong" refers to a country that is likely to win a conventional conflict. Used in this fashion, weak and strong are dyadic features -i.e., they refer to the relationship between two states (or groups of states) rather than to underlying features of the states themselves. Using this formulation, because NATO declined to spend sufficiently on defense to create a robust conventional defense, which could be expected to reliably defeat a major Warsaw Pact attack, it required nuclear weapons to create stalemate and effective deterrence. 6 Note that the conventional military balance in Europe was not as one--sided as was often portrayed. But even in the late--1980s, at the height of NATO's conventional military might, the NATO--Pact military balance was merely competitive -meaning that either side might have prevailed in a conventional conflict. There was underlying conditions that made nuclear weapons vital then still exist today. All that has changed are the seats at the International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984--85), 47--88. 7 The seminal work on the links between conventional operations and nuclear escalation is Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1991) . Writing at the end of the Cold War, Posen notes that "the most common view of how a conventional war could become a nuclear war" focuses on the danger that "had NATO found itself losing a conventional ground battle for control of Western Europe… the United States might have reached for nuclear weapons in the hopes of salvaging its position" (p. 1). But two decades later, the common understanding of the incentives of the "weak" (i.e., those who stand to lose the conventional war) has evaporated. Few national security experts - and it seems few deterrence experts - still remember that it was NATO's strategy to escalate rather than lose a conventional war. Fewer still have sought to identify the underlying strategic conditions from the Cold War that made intentional nuclear escalation by NATO seem to be a reasonable strategy. And fewer still have examined the current strategic environment to see if those strategic conditions still exist today. We seek to remind scholars, analysts, military planners, and national leaders of what was once a common view; to demonstrate that the underlying conditions and logic which led NATO to plan to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union still exist elsewhere today. The same logic that once would have led NATO to use nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact may pressure North Korea, Pakistan, China, Russia, or others to deliberately use nuclear weapons today.
the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic of war. Leaders facing the prospect of imminent defeat have compelling reasons to escalate coercively - with nuclear weaponsto bring about a ceasefire. Coercive nuclear escalation by the weaker side forces the stronger side to choose among several options - all of which are grim. It is because all of those options are unattractive that an adversary will be tempted to escalate in the first place. Viewed through this lens, Pakistan may have powerful, rational reasons to use nuclear weapons if it is losing a conventional war to India; North Korea has powerful reasons to use nuclear weapons coercively, rather than permit its enemies to prevail in a war. And Chinese leaders would face some of these same incentives if their armed forces were suffering a humiliating defeat in a war in maritime East Asia. In short, an escalatory strategy is cold--blooded, but not far--fetched -indeed, it was NATO's policy for nearly thirty years. 8
Third, this report shows that the logic of coercive nuclear escalation is well understood by countries around the world. Coercive nuclear escalation is not a theoretical possibility; it is reflected in the defense plans and nuclear employment doctrines of several nuclear--armed states. We identify the conditions under which states would be most likely to build defense plans around doctrines of coercive nuclear escalation; we then sort nuclear--armed countries according to those conditions; finally, we show that those states that should have adopted coercive nuclear doctrines (according to our argument) have actually done so.
Fourth, this report identifies global "hotspots" where plausible conventional conflicts are most likely to trigger dangerous escalatory dynamics. We posit a set of exacerbating conditions -including the prospect of conquest, regime change, and the escalatory nature of certain military operations -which make escalation during conventional war more likely, and then we use those conditions to distinguish the hotspots 8 A policy of coercive nuclear escalation - to create stalemate during an unwinnable conventional war - was NATO's policy from the mid--1960s through the end of the Cold War. Prior to the 1960s, NATO believed it could win a nuclear war, and so it had a different nuclear doctrine: immediate escalation of a conventional conflict, not to coerce, but rather to destroy the enemy's nuclear force and win. For a detailed discussion of the evolution in U. Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2001), pp. 82--98. 10 At a recent presentation to U.S. national security analysts and mid--level U.S. government national security officials, we asked, "How many of you believe a state will deliberately use nuclear weapons against the United States within 20 years?" No one raised a hand. We then asked, "How many believe Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conventional war to India?" Roughly two--thirds of the audience raised a hand. When we asked why North Korea would not face the same incentives as Pakistan, no one offered an explanation, and several of the analysts admitted they had simply never thought about the problem in that way. Washington, D.C., September 2012.
Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of stalemate -they are the ultimate weapons of the weak. Viewed through this lens, the end of the Cold War radically changed who needed nuclear weapons, but did little to reduce the utility of the weapons.
This report has five main sections. First, it explains the logic of coercive nuclear escalation -why the weak might feel compelled to escalate a conventional war, and why they might hope doing so would grant them the ceasefire they desire. Second, we demonstrate the rationality of that logic by examining the options available to a state seeking to respond to coercive nuclear escalation. Third, we assess the nuclear doctrines of nuclear--weapon states across four decades to determine if states actually act according to the logic developed in the preceding sections. Fourth, we identify the most dangerous global hotspots based on their coercive nuclear escalatory potential. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.
THE LOGIC OF COERCIVE NUCLEAR ESCALATION
The core national security problem for many militarily weak countries is straightforward: how to keep powerful enemies at bay. For weak countries, military defeat can be disastrous. In some circumstances, battlefield losses are followed by conquest and harsh treatment of the defeated society: e.g., a brutal occupation, the loss of sovereignty, or Not only do leaders face great pressure to create battlefield stalemate before they suffer irredeemable losses, they must do so quickly. A limited conventional defeat that "merely" destroys a large fraction of a country's military, or substantially degrades the institutions that ensure "government control" (for example, the leadership's security force, domestic intelligence services, internal security troops, and party militias), could trigger a wartime or post--war coup. Even if the military and security services remain loyal, the war must end before they are too degraded to suppress uprisings in the wake of the conflict. The critical message is this: America's recent conflicts are considered "regional wars" in Washington; for adversaries there is nothing "regional" or "limited" about them.
For the weak, these are existential struggles. 
Escalation and the Role of Nuclear Weapons
The leaders of weak states face life--and--death incentives to quickly halt wars that are going badly for them. But why are nuclear weapons needed for this mission? Several attributes of nuclear weapons make them uniquely useful for stalemating a stronger enemy. Nuclear weapons are small and hence relatively easy to hide -enhancing their chance of surviving the early stages of a conflict. 15 Furthermore, not many nuclear weapons need to survive: each bomb is so destructive that an adversary who can credibly threaten to deliver even a few weapons against its enemy's cities would possess a powerful coercive tool. 16 Finally, modern delivery systems -particularly ballistic missiles -allow states to deliver nuclear weapons to their target, even if its enemy controls the ground, air, and sea. In contrast, most conventional weapons become progressively harder to deliver against enemy cities as the enemy gains the upper hand militarily, and they inflict too little damage to shock the winning side into submitting to stalemate. Taken together, these three characteristics mean that even a state on the verge of being vanquished can conceivably destroy the potential victor. The implication: nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapon of the weak.
Not only are nuclear weapons better suited for wartime coercion than conventional alternatives, there are three other considerations that make more useful than other weapons that analysts worry may spread in the 21 st century, including cyber, chemical, and biological weapons.
First, although popular culture frequently portrays nuclear weapons as uncontrollably destructive, their effects can be surprisingly calibrated. Weapons designers have created nuclear weapons with widely varying "yields," allowing mission planners to tailor a strike to create a huge area of destruction or very little -whichever is desired. For example, the largest yield weapon in the current U.S. arsenal releases up to 1,200 kilotons of energy (80 Hiroshimas); the smallest U.S. nuclear weapon can be set to detonate with 15 A weapon cannot be a good tool for creating stalemate during a losing war if it is likely to be destroyed before it becomes clear that the war is going badly. In later sections of this paper we consider various adversary escalatory strategies, and the trade--offs U.S. adversaries may face between early--and late--employment of nuclear weapons during a conventional war. 16 These first two points interact: because each weapon is so destructive, a counterforce strike would need to destroy nearly every deliverable weapon to meaningfully limit damage, but that level of success is particularly difficult given that they are relatively easy to hide. 20 The technical capabilities required to utilize nuclear weapons in a calibrated fashion, as described above, are simple for any state that can produce and deliver a nuclear weapon. Weapons with a yield in the single digits of kilotons - apparently like the devices tested by North Korea - are well suited to "minimal damage" attacks. And even a primitive 20--kiloton weapon, like the first U.S. atomic bombs, would be sufficient to cause massive destructive effects if desired. Controlling height of burst with sufficient accuracy to cause or prevent fallout merely requires simple altimeters, a technology that is easily available to any country capable of firing ballistic missiles. 21 Because the victim of a nuclear strike cannot easily take steps to inoculate itself from subsequent attacks, a state using the weapons coercively can enhance the credibility of its threats through an initial strike without nullifying the effectiveness of its remaining weapons. This is an essential quality of a weapon to be used for coercion because, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, coercion works through the fear of future pain. Killing one hostage only coerces if there are others who remain in jeopardy. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence.
vulnerabilities -reducing the effectiveness of future weapons. 22 Similarly, in the aftermath of a biological weapons attack, the victim's military forces and population would don gas masks and take other steps to reduce their vulnerability to subsequent strikes. Within broader society, public health measures (for example, restrictions on travel and movement, the use of surgical masks, heightened health monitoring, and the isolation of contagious individuals) would reduce the effectiveness of follow--on attacks. But, in contrast, the initial use of nuclear weapons would not nullify the nuclear arsenal to the degree that bio--or cyber--attacks would. Unless the victim of the nuclear attack can reliably shoot down ballistic missiles, which remains a very difficult undertaking, 23 a weak state can use nuclear weapons coercively and still retain the ability to conduct future attacks.
Finally, the effects of nuclear weapons are far more predictable than cyber or bio weapons, an essential attribute for a leader who needs to coerce an immediate end to fighting. Nuclear weapons are more predictable on at least three key dimensions: the functioning of the weapon, the damage it will cause, and the timing of the effects. No one knows whether the coercive effect of a nuclear, or biological, or a cyber attack would work, as we discuss below. But leaders under duress could at least be confident that a well--tested nuclear weapon would function; would create a reasonably predictable level of damage (as long as targeters selected a height of burst to prevent fallout); and would detonate at roughly the desired time. By contrast, one cannot know whether a cyber weapon will infect the target computer system -or whether an infection would produce the desired 22 Those who examine the code may not merely learn about the vulnerabilities in the target computer system's code, they may also learn about technical or organizational vulnerabilities that permitted the malware to be delivered to the target. For instance, computer networks that have no connectivity to the outside world have been penetrated by luring employees with access to unknowingly (or intentionally) use infected flash drives in the otherwise--sealed--off network. But once that vulnerability was exploited, re--attack became more difficult (e.g., workers at sensitive sites were warned about such operations, and in some organizations USB ports have been physically sealed there is currently no substitute for nuclear weapons.
IS ESCALATION RATIONAL? POSING FOUR GRIM OPTIONS
Losing a conventional war could have catastrophic consequences for the defeated society or leaders; but how could a country, facing an overpowering foe, employ nuclear weapons to create stalemate? Wouldn't the use of nuclear weapons by a weak country against a strong one incite a devastating nuclear response, rather than a truce? For example, in a war on the Korean Peninsula, wouldn't North Korean use of nuclear weapons against the Republic of Korea, Japan, or U.S. military forces in the region trigger a devastating U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike? If so, then nuclear escalation would simply turn 24 Note that even after a cyber strike, gauging effectiveness is challenging. After years of self--congratulation, evidence is emerging that the most famous offensive cyber attack in history -Stuxnet -was a tactical and strategic failure, even using the most modest definition of success (i.e., temporary reduction in Iran's enrichment of uranium at the Natanz facility). According to IAEA documents, the Stuxnet attack barely reduced Iran's rate of uranium enrichment, which quickly returned to (or exceeded) pre--Stuxnet rates. We thank Jonathan Lindsay for bringing this to our attention. 25 On the limits of coercion using conventional weapons, Of course, the issuance of such a threat does not mean that North Korea could carry out that operation. U.S. and allied missile defenses would attempt to shoot down North Korean missiles, and the United States and its allies might seek to prevent a follow--up North Korean nuclear attack by launching a conventional or nuclear counterforce strike (as described below). The point here is that the issuance of a coercive nuclear threat by Pyongyang during a conventional war (perhaps in conjunction with a small nuclear strike) would not be irrational; far from "crazy", such a strategy would mirror NATO's Cold War plans for coercive nuclear escalation, which were also designed to create stalemate to avert a conventional military defeat.
involved an actual nuclear strike. But it is enlightening to consider carefully the options that a U.S. president would confront in such circumstances. Each of these options is grim. Korea on a U.S. military base?" -a common response is a more colorful version of "launch punitive nuclear retaliation." In other words, one option would be to launch one or more nuclear attacks designed to kill the North Korean regime's leaders and destroy the remaining institutions of the North Korean state. After the retaliatory strike, South Korean and U.S. forces would still march toward Pyongyang as soon as conditions allowed. The purpose of this response would be to send a clear message to the world -nuclear escalation will beget a horrifying response.
The disadvantages of this approach are substantial. First, and most obviously, the United States would be committing mass murder. Hundreds of thousands of North Korean civilians would be killed for acts committed by a small coterie of leaders. Second, nuclear strikes aimed at deeply buried leadership bunkers would require "ground bursts" -detonations well below any altitude that would avert fallout - and would therefore spread highly radioactive material across the region. Depending on the location of the bunkers and the season (which affects wind direction), lethal fallout would likely scatter across 28 To be clear, this scenario is merely intended to illustrate how coercive escalation might work - that is, to show the logic of coercive nuclear escalation by illustrating the terrible dilemmas faced by the victim of a coercive campaign. The details in any scenario are not predictable, and are not central to this analysis. The point here is that coercive escalation has a compelling logic, as NATO, Pakistan, and others have discovered.
South Korea, and possibly Japan or China. 29 Finally, a punitive strike would not solve the major dilemma at hand: North Korean nuclear forces would presumably already have been dispersed and could still carry out their retaliatory nuclear strikes against Japan. The visceral "bomb them back to the stone age" response is problematic on many dimensions.
Option Two: Conventional Military Response. A second option would be to condemn the nuclear strike, send aid to the people of Okinawa, and accelerate the conventional offensive toward Pyongyang to end the war and capture the North Korean leadership as rapidly as possible. The advantage of this approach is that it reinforces the core of U.S. nuclear policy:
by not giving in to coercion, and by not responding in kind, the U.S. response would demonstrate that nuclear weapons are both horrible and useless. The subsequent trials of surviving senior North Korean leaders would demonstrate to the leaders of other weak states that nuclear escalation is not a viable way to escape the calamity of military defeat.
The disadvantages of this strategy are enormous. First, the strategy would accept the risk that North Korea would carry out its threat and launch nuclear strikes against a half--dozen Japanese cities. There is substantial risk that some (perhaps many) of those missiles would leak through missile defenses. Second, and relatedly, this course of action would presumably be implemented over the strenuous objections of Japan's government.
The consequence would likely be the end of the U.S.--Japan alliance. More broadly, if the United States ignores the pleas of a critical ally, and the consequences were the destruction of several of that ally's cities (in a war in which the ally played no direct role), many U.S.
allies around Asia and the rest of the world may rethink their tight military ties to the United States.
Option Three: Counterforce: Disarm, then Defeat. The third option would be to respond to the nuclear attack with a major military strike against known and suspected North Korean nuclear targets to prevent North Korea from launching additional weapons. A counterforce strike could be conducted with conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, or a mixture of the 29 We conducted fallout analysis of various hypothetical U.S. ground burst strikes against North Korea, using a U.S. Defense Department computer model called HPAC, and depending on the target location and season, the radioactive fallout from U.S. strikes might kill more South Korean civilians than North Koreans. leadership -or punitive -option described above). 30 A third disadvantage is that a counterforce strike would probably not destroy every North Korean nuclear weapon; some weapons might survive and be used against U.S. allies. This option, therefore, like the first two, accepts a high likelihood of one or more allied cities being destroyed, along with subsequent damage to the U.S. global alliance network and grand strategy. This option becomes more perilous the closer that North Korea moves toward deploying long--range ballistic missiles that can target U.S. cities, as well as regional allies. 31 30 It is critical to note that strikes on tunnel entrances and other hardened facilities may not require ground bursts, and appear to be possible without creating significant fallout. Unlike a "punitive" strike designed to kill the leadership (option 1) the nuclear missions in option 3 do not need to destroy deeply buried facilitiesbut could merely destroy the near--surface elements of those facilities (using air bursts) to disable the weapons or prevent them from being used until teams could seize the sites. Declassified documents reveal that the United States has been planning low--fallout, low--casualty nuclear options for decades. The downsides of accepting a ceasefire are also very significant. Accepting a negotiated settlement after suffering a nuclear strike (or after receiving an explicit nuclear threat) might be very costly politically - both for the United States and personally for the December 5, 2012. 32 To be clear, the U.S. nuclear response in this option would not be designed to kill the North Korean leadership or disarm its nuclear forces (options 1 and 3, respectively). The goal would simply be to provide political cover for the ceasefire. 33 The United States employed a similar strategy - as a backup plan in case the blockade failed - during the Cuban missile crisis. The White House established a contingency plan to secretly ask the UN General Secretary to intervene and urge both sides to reach a compromise.
adversaries, but also by allies that lose faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And while symbolic escalation and subterfuge might make the "deal" politically palatable in the short term, when the dust settled it would become apparent that coercive escalation had worked.
None of the response options discussed above are attractive. The reflexive course of action in the wake of a nuclear attack on an ally -a devastating nuclear retaliatory strikeis not grounded in a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of that response. A U.S.
president might select that option, but nothing about such a decision is preordained.
Others believe that the United States would select the counter--force option; once an enemy has used nuclear weapons, a U.S. president would have no alternative to destroying as many of those weapons as possible. (It is noteworthy that current proposals regarding the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal make the nuclear force less well suited for a counterforce strike.)
All the response options in this scenario are grim, but options three and four would likely dominate the first two. Marching to Pyongyang and simply absorbing additional attacks on Japanese cities - praying that missile defense will work flawlessly - (i.e., option two) seems unviable, as does a punitive counterstrike not specifically focused on disarming the North Korean nuclear arsenal (option one). The wrenching decision for a U.S. president would be whether to order a nuclear counterforce strike to disarm the enemy (option three), or whether to accept a ceasefire with some attempt at saving face (option four). The key factor pushing a U.S. leader toward option three or option four is the likely effectiveness of a counterforce strike. If a president believed that a counterforce strike would leave the enemy with zero -or perhaps a couple -deliverable nuclear weapons, and if he or she believed that it was possible to execute such an attack without killing large numbers of noncombatants (particularly allied civilians), he or she might lean in that direction. On the other hand, if the president believed that a counterforce strike would still permit the adversary to destroy many allied cities -or U.S. cities -he or she might prefer a face--saving symbolic strike followed by a ceasefire. 
EVIDENCE OF COERCIVE NUCLEAR DOCTRINES
Nuclear weapons have the capacity to be the ultimate tools of stalemate. If weak nuclear--armed states feel sufficiently threatened by a militarily superior foe, they could develop defense plans around the concept of coercive nuclear escalation, and create nuclear doctrines for wartime employment. This report, so far, makes the case that such steps are logical. But do countries actually follow this cold--blooded logic?
To explore whether weak states actually employ this logic, we first identify below the conditions under which states would be most likely to build defense plans around doctrines of coercive nuclear escalation. Second, we sort nuclear--armed countries according to those conditions. Finally, we determine whether those states that (according to our argument) should have adopted coercive nuclear doctrines have actually done so.
Two factors should have a powerful effect on whether nuclear--armed states develop coercive nuclear doctrines. First, countries are more likely to view nuclear weapons in this manner if they expect to lose conventional wars. In other words, coercive nuclear doctrines should be far more appealing to the weak than to the strong. Second, these doctrines will be more attractive to states for which the consequences of conventional Figure 1 illustrates our claim graphically and offers a first--cut at identifying strategically relevant dyads along these two dimensions. Each of the two variables we describe is, in reality, continuous: the expected likelihood of defeat in a conventional war could be any value between 0 and 1; and the negative consequences of defeat could range from nothing to total annihilation. But to facilitate coding - and avoid suggesting greater precision than is possible using these variables -we treat each of the variables as if it were binary, thus resulting in four categories. If our argument about coercive nuclear escalation is correct, then the countries represented in the dyads in the upper--right corner -i.e., those nuclear--armed state that expect to suffer conventional defeats over issues of grave importance -should be most likely to adopt coercive nuclear doctrines. Figure 2 reproduces the first figure, but it also indicates (in bold text) which countries appear to have adopted a coercive nuclear doctrine and possess the theater or battlefield nuclear capabilities to execute it. (As described above, in the case of contemporary NATO, we separate out the Baltic states, because they are located in a different strategic quadrant from the other NATO members, and they have different preferences regarding NATO nuclear doctrine). countries that have not articulated doctrines for the coercive use of nuclear escalation. One state -North Korea -is ambiguous about its nuclear doctrine. 35 35 Critics may object that Figures 1 and 2 should include all states -and locate them along these two dimensions -not merely the nuclear--armed countries. After all, the theory we've advanced predicts that any state that perceived a high chance of suffering a costly military defeat would be powerfully inclined to adopt a coercive nuclear doctrine -even if that first required acquiring nuclear weapons. We agree with this logic up to a point, but the critique goes too far. A large body of evidence suggests that proliferation decisions involve a careful balancing of security concerns with a host of factors arising from domestic politics: e.g., the interests of the military organizations (who often oppose these weapons); the interests of various parts of a country's scientific community; commercial interests, which might fear sanctions and isolation. Even in the domain of security concerns, the logic is far from deterministic because several countries (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan) have directly linked their non--proliferation stance to promises of military support by the United States. Acquiring nuclear weapons and adopting coercive nuclear doctrines would mitigate some security concerns for these countries and exacerbate others. In short, we are not offering a theory of proliferation here, but rather an explanation for the adoption of coercive nuclear doctrines by nuclear--armed states. By doing so, we assess the likelihood of deliberate nuclear escalation in the midst of conventional wars. . It is worth noting that North Korea is left un--coded, because it has not publicly articulated enough to identify an explicit nuclear doctrine, though the Pyongyang government has certainly issued statements that suggest a willingness to use nuclear weapons -or other unspecified means -to punish its enemies if it were attacked. China is the clear outlier -the country that avows a "no first use" nuclear doctrine despite its location in the upper--right corner. 36 Finally, it is notable that the nuclear--armed states not only sort themselves in the predicted fashion on Figure 2 , but also several countries changed nuclear doctrines soon after they moved from one quadrant to another. During the Cold War, when NATO felt unable to defend itself adequately from a major conventional attack, it adopted a coercive nuclear doctrine. When the balance of power shifted - moving most NATO countries from the upper--right to the lower--left quadrants -so did the views of many alliance members about NATO's nuclear doctrine, and even about the legitimacy of the weapons they recently relied upon themselves. 37 Russia shifted in the opposite direction. During the Cold War, Russia supported (at least rhetorically) the position of "no first use," but now that the military balance has shifted sharply against them Russian officials have publicly stated that 36 We recently attended a conference in Washington (2012) in which several U.S. government officials with expertise on China, and who have responsibilities that include U.S.--China nuclear relations, conveyed that they believe China's "no first use" pledges should not be interpreted literally. They indicated that discussions with official Chinese delegations about these issues reinforced the impression that China's actual nuclear policy is more nuanced than "no first use," and that China's representatives indicated that a range of non--nuclear U.S. military actions might trigger Chinese nuclear response. But, for the sake of coding consistency, we coded China as not having a coercive nuclear doctrine. 37 In fact, some statements by current and former U.S. officials to justify the ongoing U.S. effort to delegitimize nuclear weapons and work toward global nuclear disarmament note that the United States and its allies have the world's most powerful conventional forces in the world -implicitly acknowledging that these weapons were once useful because NATO and the U.S. were "weak." Those statements never draw attention to some darker implications: that weak states will resist efforts to deny them their needed instrument of stalemate as vigorously as NATO rejected Soviet suggestions for a mutual "no first use" pledge during the Cold War, and that efforts to delegitimize these weapons may come at the expense of U.S. allies who still feel some risk of catastrophic military defeat (i.e., Israel). they rely upon tactical and theater nuclear weapons to balance against the superior military forces of an unspecified powerful alliance.
The overarching argument in the first half of this report is that the same escalation dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist today as well -and they are just as powerful. Nuclear deterrence is not a legacy mission, because states still face the same critical national security threats they faced during the Cold War and throughout history:
namely, the leaders of weak states fear that the strong will conquer them or take steps that will lead to their downfall. The high--stakes poker game of international politics has not fundamentally changed - contrary to the claims of many observers. What has principally changed is merely who has the best cards. Those who were weak during the Cold War are now strong; and another set of militarily "weak" countries -such as North Korea, Iran, and even China and Russia -now clutch nuclear weapons to defend themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did.
The failure of analysts in the West to appreciate the continued value of nuclear weapons reflects a striking lack of strategic empathy. The first rule of good strategy is to develop an understanding of how one's adversaries see the world, and how they might utilize their resources to achieve their goals. Analysts in the United States who claim that nuclear weapons are essentially irrelevant to the problems of the 21 st Century either ignore this dictum or have forgotten what was once better understood: how helpful these weapons can be for stalemating the strong.
IDENTIFYING THE MOST DANGEROUS CONFLICTS
Weak countries have a powerful interest in using nuclear weapons during a conventional war to create a stalemate and prevent catastrophic defeat. And, as we illustrated above, they have historically adopted nuclear doctrines for exactly that purpose.
But for U.S. policymakers and senior military leaders, the key question is not about the past but the future: which potential U.S. adversaries and conflicts are most prone to coercive escalation? More broadly, which of the world's "hotspots" are prone to see conventional wars escalate and become nuclear conflicts?
Plausibility of Conquest
The logic developed throughout this report suggests three conditions that should help identify the most escalation--prone conflicts. First, leaders should be most likely to take the risks associated with nuclear escalation if the war they are waging may lead to the conquest of their country. A state's political and military leaders (and not just the top few) stand to lose power, wealth, the ability to protect their families, and in many cases their own lives -either at the hands of the conquering government or angry domestic rivals. For the conquered society, occupation can be disastrous even if the conqueror has no desire to inflict collective punishment.
The factors that make conquest of the losing state likely in some wars - and less so in others -are varied, and no simple rulebook that can be applied to every case. 
Vulnerability to Regime Change
A second key condition that may affect the propensity of leaders to escalate conventional wars -rather than accept defeat -is their vulnerability to coups or revolutions. 39 As we described above, losing power often results in terrible outcomes for a country's elite. To avoid losing power during a war, however, a country's leaders must do more than merely deter a wartime enemy from conquering them; they must also prevent the war from unleashing dynamics within their own country that trigger a coup or revolution -during or after the conflict. Countries whose governments face substantial domestic opposition will, therefore, face intense pressure to coerce an end to hostilities 38 The framework we create here to investigate risks of coercive nuclear escalation is intentionally simple -to allow for easy application - but should not obscure the gradations in the factors we describe. For example, while states that are susceptible to conquest are expected to be more likely to employ coercive escalation than those who have no fear that war will lead to loss of territory, some states face the prospect of loss of key territories -short of conquest. A major Indian conventional offensive might exploit Pakistan's narrowness to cut the major lines of communication between North and South. Similarly, if China's leaders are as committed to Taiwan as their public positions imply, they may see a war that leads to Taiwan's independence as a loss which -while far less than conquest -nevertheless means the loss of valuable territory. The "conquest" factor is a useful heuristic to distinguish higher escalatory risks from lower risks, but such categories and dichotomies should be applied with care. 39 The research project was framed to investigate the incentives of weak states -i.e., defined as those that expect to lose conventional wars - to use nuclear weapons to stalemate their opponents. The research was framed in that fashion because of the value of nuclear weapons as a stalemating device, because of the substantial history of states relying on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weakness, and because of the U.S. interest in deterring its "weak" adversaries from escalating. However, the vulnerability of leaders in some countries to coups and revolutions, either during or after wars, and the escalatory pressures that those vulnerabilities create (to coerce a rapid cessation of hostilities) should pressure both weak states and stronger ones to escalate to rapidly end a conflict that threatens their domestic power at home. In other words, there may be escalatory pathways that would lead Russia, China, or other states with domestic stability concerns to escalate a war with a weaker power. rapidly, before regime opponents are emboldened or before too much damage is done to the regime's internal security forces.
Wars tend to undermine governing regimes in a variety of ways. In many authoritarian regimes, popular uprisings are prevented by "collective action" problems: if every regime opponent rebelled at once, they could overwhelm the regime's internal security forces, but no group wants to be the first: it would be slaughtered, and there is no guarantee that other groups or individuals would follow their lead. Oppressive governments exacerbate these collective action problems by using spies and informants to make coordination against the regime too dangerous. 40 If a government suffers a major military defeat -even one with merely "limited objectives" -the evidence of disarray among the leadership and regime security forces may embolden domestic opponents to rebel. This dynamic was triggered in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War: the signs of chaos within Saddam Hussein's government, and the appearance that his regime was on its last legs, emboldened Shi'ite groups, principally from Southern Iraq, to rebel against Saddam's rule.
In addition to emboldening regime opponents, the conduct of the war might directly reduce the ability of the regime to defend itself against its opponents. If the war involves attacks on internal security forces, leaders may become unable to defend themselves against a popular uprising, or defend themselves against a military coup, or even against a coup attempt by elements of those security forces. Oppressive governments typically put their most--trusted allies in charge of leadership security forces. If those forces are being targeted and destroyed -and hence the regime's closest allies are being killed -the leadership may face intense pressure to compel a ceasefire immediately. Finally, for many governments, the greatest threat to regime survival comes from the country's own military.
If a war results in the devastation of a country's military forces -and the humiliation of the military leadership -the risk of a coup surges. As a result, leaders must compel a ceasefire long before enemy forces start to advance on their capital; they must create a ceasefire before domestic opponents sense weakness, before regime security elements are too 40 The seminal work on collective action problems is Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1965 degraded, and before its military becomes too demoralized and angry at the political leadership.
The implication for regimes that face considerable internal opposition is clear: if a war begins to go badly, find a way to create a battlefield stalemate immediately - or face the prospects of a revolution or coup. The implication for countries that might face weak regimes in war is equally important: adopting even a "limited aims" war plan may not be sufficient to prevent escalation. Inflicting a major conventional defeat on the enemy - like the one inflicted on Iraq in 1991, and the one the United States would seek to inflict in almost any limited war -may cross the enemy's escalatory red line.
Blinding and Disarming Military Operations
The third key factor that may make leaders more inclined to employ nuclear weapons coercively stems from the style of war waged by their opponents. If leaders are driven to escalate by fear of conquest or post--war regime change, then certain kinds of military operations are likely to exacerbate that fear. Specifically, operations that aim to blind enemy command and control, directly target political leaders and regime security elements, or degrade strategic deterrent forces will intensify adversary incentives to escalate.
Conventional war has changed dramatically over the past three decades as computers have become fully integrated into every facet of warfare. The computerization of weapons and warfare has changed nearly every aspect of combat: e.g., command, communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and the precision with which weapons can be delivered against targets. Increasingly, military forces derive combat effectiveness from their ability to integrate information from multiple sources, make effective decisions, and coordinate the actions of widely dispersed units. Thus, the battlefield payoffs from disrupting an adversary's command and control system -i.e., severing the links between sensors and commanders and forces, and destroying command sites themselves -have become enormous. Not surprisingly, powerful states like the United States have made such operations the centerpiece of their way of war. The problem is that although this style of warfare can produce one--sided battlefield outcomes, it is also highly escalatory.
Over the past twenty years, every major U.S. military operation has begun with an intense effort to destroy the enemy's command and control. For example, the first five days of U.S. air operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War focused on degrading the Iraqi military's central nervous system, rather than hacking off its limbs. More than a thousand airstrikes targeted Iraqi surface--to--air radars and missile systems (to allow the United States unfettered access to Iraqi airspace), command posts, electricity, communications, and organs of government control -all aimed at denying the Iraqi leadership "situational awareness" and preventing it from coordinating military forces in the field. 41 Of these strikes, nearly two hundred were launched against Iraq's leadership on the first night of the air war -representing an intense effort to kill the senior members in Saddam's government. 42 The air war against Serbia (1999) and during the Iraq War (2003) Table 178 . Here we count each strike sortie as a single "strike." The sorties reported here refer to strikes on the categories of "C3," "electricity," "government control," and "SAM," as reported in GWAPS. The 1,002 sorties over five days represents 26% of all Coalition strike sorties in that time period; on the first day alone, 31% of the strikes on Iraq were directed against these target categories. Evidence suggests that the effort to destroy Iraqi command and control in 1991 was not nearly as effective as is often suggested, but the 1991 air war was fought with very few precision guided munitions. The 1991 air campaign charted the direction for future U. International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall1997), 137--146. 42 On the first day of the 1991 air war, there were 193 strikes against Iraqi leadership targets, in which category we include strikes on "C3" and "Government Control" targets. Data derived from GWAPS, V5, Table  178 . There is no doubt that the purpose was to kill Saddam Hussein and other senior leaders. In an initial briefing on the air war plan, U.S. military planners illustrated the U.S. air war plan as a "bulls eye" with the words "Saddam Hussein" in the center. Concerns that this depiction might suggest that the USAF was violating restrictions against assassination led the war planners to replace the words "Saddam Hussein" on their briefing slides with the word "Leadership. In addition to blinding adversaries, sophisticated militaries like that of the United
States have a powerful proclivity to target the most lethal weapons systems of their enemies, including weapons of mass destruction. From an operational standpoint, this makes good sense -during a war it seems logical to degrade an enemy's most lethal weapons. However, attacks on an adversary's WMD sites and delivery systems also inherently open the door for follow--on operations to overthrow those regimes. Stated differently, if an enemy's weapons of mass destruction are the ultimate deterrent and guarantee of its regime survival, then efforts to destroy those weapons will pose an existential threat -forcing it to escalate to coerce an end to those attacks. Attacking an enemy's strategic deterrent assets is, therefore, highly escalatory.
In recent wars, the United States has often sought to destroy the enemy's strategic assets. In 1991, the U.S. air campaign included intense attacks on Iraqi WMD sites and suspected delivery systems. More than one hundred WMD--related targets were struck on the first night alone, and nearly six hundred WMD targets were attacked during the first five days of the campaign -comprising 15% of all U.S. strikes. 44 The United States The effective - but potentially escalatory - style of conventional warfare is likely to remain central to U.S. war plans in the coming decades, and it is unlikely to be simply shelved for conflict scenarios involving nuclear--armed enemies. For example, the over--arching U.S. concept for military operations against China in the coming decades - "AirSea Battle" - calls for air and missile strikes against large numbers of radars, communications nodes, and other command and control targets across the Chinese homeland. 46 44 Includes strikes on targets identified as "NBC" [nuclear, biological, chemical] and strikes on targets associated with SCUD missiles. The numbers here only cover the first five days of the air war and hence do not include air attacks as part of the "SCUD hunt" later in the war -which arguably were intended to suppress Iraq's punitive conventional missile strikes on Israel and Saudi Arabia rather than destroy WMD delivery systems. The data is from GWAPS, Vol. 5, Table 178 . 45 This figure counts the targets in the "WD" target sets in the "Joint Integrated Prioritized Target There is also a powerful logic for rapidly degrading those enemy weapon systems that could cause extreme damage to U.S. allies, forces, and the U.S. homeland. But waging war in this fashion -blinding and disarming the enemy, while destroying his leadership sitesplaces great pressure on enemy leaders to escalate to force such attacks to stop.
In sum, strong states with sophisticated militaries like the United States will almost inevitably target weaker states' command and control systems, leadership, and strategic assets at the outset of a conventional conflict. This compounds the adversary's fear of not surviving the conflict, thus making nuclear escalation as a means of forestalling defeat more likely. 47 A war over Taiwan would not make leaders in Beijing fear "conquest" in the narrow sense of the term. However, as we discussed above, conquest should not be conceived in a strictly binary sense (i.e., conquered or not). The loss of some highly valued territory, while not as bad as complete conquest and occupation, might entail a major loss to the core interests of a state. If Chinese leaders are to be believed that they see Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, and especially if the people of China feel the same, it may be too costly to leaders in Beijing to accept defeat in a war over Taiwan, especially if the consequences might be Taiwanese independence. 48 Iran is not believed to have nuclear weapons. This row indicates the escalatory risks in a future war in the Strait of Hormuz if Iran has subsequently acquired nuclear weapons. 49 As described above in the text, the risk of outright conquest of Pakistan by India appears low; however, most key Pakistani cities are very close to the Indian border, so Pakistan's leaders may reasonably fear limited territorial incursions by India that would isolate critical Pakistani population centers. This is reflected in the "No/Yes" value under the "Conquest plausible?" column.
Escalation Risks in Potential Conventional Conflicts
sufficiently weaken the regime and trigger a coup or revolution. Furthermore, CFC military operations will likely seek to blind the North Korean command and control, destroy leadership sites, and perhaps degrade their strategic weapons. If war erupts on the Korean Peninsula, preventing escalation will be a very difficult challenge.
Second, a conventional conflict in maritime East Asia between the United States and China may entail far greater nuclear escalation risks than is commonly recognized.
Because the conquest of China is not plausible, many analysts assume that the escalation risks in a U.S.--China clash are substantially muted. But that optimistic assumption overlooks two critical facts, which are highlighted in Table  1 In sum, there is a common view within the U.S. national security community that the intentional use of nuclear weapons by a state actor against the United States is very 50 The logic of Iranian nuclear escalation, and Tehran's escalatory options, would be directly analogous to North Korea's escalatory logic and options during a conventional war, as described above (pp. 13--26) . In the Iran case, potential targets for an initial coercive escalatory strike might include a U.S. military bases (e.g., Al Udeid, or NSA Bahrain) or a city in a regional ally.
unlikely. The logic developed in this study raises profound questions about that view.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, countries and alliances that faced overwhelming conventional adversaries have relied on nuclear weapons, and planned to use them during war, to stalemate their foes. During the Cold War the United States and NATO felt conventionally overmatched and planned to escalate coercively stalemate a war in Europe;
today it is North Korea, and China, and Pakistan, and Iran, who are overmatched. The challenge that the United States military faces today - devising ways to wage conventional wars and defeat U.S. enemies without forcing them to escalate - was never solved by the Soviet Union. Soviet proposals for a mutual "no first use" pledge fell on deaf ears because nuclear escalation seemed to be NATO's only means of thwarting a conventional invasion by the Warsaw Pact. Devising concepts for winning wars without triggering adversary escalation should be a top priority for U.S. conventional war planners; fashioning a conventional and nuclear force structure that is well suited for deterring adversary wartime escalation should be a top priority for U.S. force structure planners.
COUNTERARGUMENTS
Critics might concede that conventional wars between nuclear--armed adversaries would be highly escalatory, yet counter that such wars are unlikely to occur in the first place. In fact, critics might say, the arguments that we present here about the dangers of wartime escalation are exactly the reason that these conventional wars will not occur. As Kenneth Waltz argues, nuclear weapons do not merely deter nuclear attacks; they deter conventional attacks as well. As he explains, launching a major conventional offensive against a nuclear--armed state would be foolhardy; yet, launching a limited conventional attack would be equally senseless - as the small potential gains would be trivial compared to any residual risk of escalation. 51 In short, critics might argue that it is precisely because our arguments about the danger of escalation are correct that these wars will not happen. More broadly, the claim that the risk of catastrophe will reliably deter conventional wars seems to contradict much of history. For most of history, starting a war meant risking catastrophe. Leaders who lost surrendered not merely their crowns, but also their heads.
In the era of dynastic succession, defeat often meant that one's children were killed as well - to prevent future claims to rule. Throughout history, those who led rebellions - against ancient empires, colonial powers, or even against modern occupiers -usually paid with their lives (and often died gruesomely). And the populations on whose behalf the insurgents rebelled were sometimes slaughtered, to teach others not to emulate their disloyalty. In more modern times, the Japanese who planned Pearl Harbor understood that they were attacking a country with ten times their economic power, and they understood that if the war went badly it meant catastrophe for themselves and Japan. (They were right.) But despite those risks, the Japanese attacked. Germany's leaders understood that they were risking personal and national calamity when they invaded France, and especially when they invaded the Soviet Union. But they attacked anyway. analysts -both inside and outside of government -need to develop richer theories of intra--war deterrence and escalation control during regional conflicts. In addition to this call for analytical reinvigoration, our analysis makes two critical recommendations for U.S. defense planners to mitigate the coming dangers. First, we urge the reevaluation of existing regional war plans -and conventional concept of operations (CONOPS) - to assess their suitability for waging conventional war against nuclear--armed adversaries without triggering escalation. Second, this analysis suggests that as the United
States considers the future size and shape of its nuclear arsenal, the challenges of intra--war deterrence and escalation control should be paramount considerations. Each of these issues is discussed briefly below.
Implications for War Plans and Conventional CONOPS
The first recommendation of this analysis is that the critical goals of escalation prevention and escalation control must be worked into the very core of U.S. regional war plans, at least when facing nuclear--armed adversaries. This recommendation has at least two implications.
First, when creating plans against nuclear--armed adversaries, U.S. regional commands should develop both limited and decisive military options, to provide alternatives for U.S. political leaders. In many cases, limited contingency plans may already exist. However, what is essential -and perhaps lacking -is ensuring that the limited options are not merely limited in the endstates they seek, but that they are also limited in the operations they entail. In particular, limited war plans designed to prevent adversary escalation -by demonstrating that the enemy leadership will survive the war -should probably not seek to destroy the enemy's national--level command and control, directly target senior enemy leaders, or seek to destroy adversary strategic forces. Those would all be logical operations in a war designed to achieve decisive objectives, but they are counter--productive in a limited war.
This simple observation -that military operations must be consistent with campaign objectives -may seem obvious, but ensuring this consistency given the complexity of modern military forces is a substantial challenge. In 1991, for example, the United States conducted a limited war to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, while leaving Saddam Hussein's regime in power (to dissuade him from using his chemical and biological weapons, and to avoid the costs of occupation). But although the Coalition's goals were limited, the air operation involved hundreds of strikes against Iraqi command and control and senior leadership targets. U.S. air operations in 1991 made sense from the perspective of destroying Iraqi military capabilities, but were inconsistent with the overarching objective of leaving the Iraqi regime in power -and signaling that restraint to the Iraqi leadership. 55 The essential point is that the United States requires both limited and decisive military options, and that the limited plans must be internally coherent -i.e.,
limited not only in their goals but also in the nature of the operations.
55 Similar contradictions could arise in a future war on the Korean Peninsula. A limited Combined Forces Command (CFC) war plan might seek to avoid North Korean escalation by having CFC ground forces advance only a few kilometers north of the DMZ -remaining far south of Pyongyang. But if the CFC air war plan entails air strikes throughout North Korea to blind adversary command and control, target senior leaders, and degrade its strategic forces, adversary leaders may reasonably interpret these operations as part of a decisive -not limited -campaign.
The second, related, implication is the need for concepts for conventional operations (CONOPS) that can produce the favorable, one--sided conventional engagements that the United States has come to expect without degrading the adversary's national--level command and control or directly targeting enemy leadership. The new American way of war - destroying enemy command and control - is a central reason why the United States has been able to produce such favorable battlefield outcomes in past decades. Limiting U.S.
attacks on adversary sensors, command sites, communications hubs, and leadership may be essential for avoiding escalation, but those restrictions would come at a cost, perhaps a steep one, in terms of U.S. battlefield effectiveness. The challenge is for U.S. military planners to develop CONOPS that will enable the United States to create one--sided conventional victories, and yet leave the enemy's senior leadership with sufficient situational awareness to see that U.S. objectives are truly limited.
To be clear, the development of limited war plans does not imply that limited war is always the best approach when confronting nuclear--armed adversaries. In some cases, wars may be triggered by events that compel U.S. leaders to pursue decisive victory, conquest, and/or regime change - even if the enemy has nuclear weapons. Furthermore, restricting U.S. conventional operations and, in particular, withholding attacks on enemy strategic weapons involves major risks. But our overarching point is simple: if the analysis in this paper is sound, then future adversaries have a powerful incentive to use nuclear coercion to stalemate U.S. conventional military power. Given that reality, the United States should develop both limited and decisive military options for wars against nuclear--armed adversaries: limited options to try to prevent adversary escalation, and decisive options for those circumstances in which escalation prevention has already failed, is deemed impossible, or is a lower priority than achieving decisive victory. Half--steps in this direction -such as contingency plans that are limited in the endstates they seek, but are not limited in the operations they entail - may pose the greatest dangers of escalation by obscuring the escalatory potential of a regional conflicts.
Implications for U.S. Nuclear Force Structure
A second major implication of this study is that proposals for the future of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal should be assessed against the deterrence mission that, based on this analysis, seems to be both "most demanding" and "most likely": preventing and mitigating escalation during a conventional conflict. 56 Public debates about the future of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal often assess the force's adequacy solely against the missions of peacetime assurance and peacetime deterrence. But nuclear deterrence must succeed all the timenot just during peace. Nuclear deterrence must succeed even when U.S. enemies are engaged in conventional wars and fighting for their lives.
The analysis in this report of U.S. options in the face of adversary nuclear escalation -the "four grim options" discussed above (pp. 19--25) -suggests that the two primary choices for U.S. leaders (accepting a cease--fire or conducting a disarming strike) become only one option, ceasefire, unless the United States has palatable disarming strike capabilities. Stated differently, unless the United States has palatable disarming strike options, nuclear coercion against the United States during a conventional war will likely succeed, and thus deterring a coercive strike will be very difficult. Ensuring that the United
States can respond effectively to nuclear coercive threats is thus the foundation of the U.S.
deterrent, and the foundation of U.S. efforts to assure its allies.
A credible deterrent in the context of a conventional war should give U.S. leaders a range of retaliatory options, including the ability to respond to nuclear attacks with either conventional or nuclear strikes, to retaliate with strikes against an enemy's nuclear forces rather than its cities, and to minimize casualties. Deterrence during conventional wars would thus be enhanced by an arsenal that included capabilities to conduct prompt and accurate strikes, using high--or low--yield weapons, against enemy nuclear forces. This is not a call for brand new nuclear capabilities: the foundation for this flexible deterrent already exists. The question, however, is whether those flexible retaliatory options will be preserved in the force as the arsenal shrinks -especially in the face of proposals to consolidate from a triad to a dyad, and to greatly reduce arsenal size. In short, if the United States hopes to deter adversary nuclear escalation during future conventional conflicts, it needs to ensure that the threat of its own nuclear operations is credible to adversaries. its forces and the forces and populations of regional allies, then a robust and flexible U.S.
nuclear force structure would be a vital necessity.
Taking a step back, the findings from this report may be startling for most defense and international security analysts -but they should not be surprised. Historically, we know that weak countries have planned to use nuclear weapons coercively to stalemate the strong. We know that the United States and its NATO allies were resolved to do exactly this when they felt weak. We have contemporary public statements by several so--called "weak"
countries that confirm that they currently view their nuclear weapons in this manner, and plan to use their weapons to stalemate powerful enemies. And we know that U.S.
conventional CONOPs envision the United States fighting conventional wars by blinding our enemies and, in many cases, targeting adversary strategic weapon systems.
And yet, among many in the U.S. nuclear weapons community, the disarmament community, and more broadly across the U.S. military, it is a standard assumption that no country would dare use nuclear weapons against the United States. To the contrary, our findings suggest that the deterrence challenges ahead are far more difficult than is generally imagined, and the deterrence mission in particular requires far more attention than it has recently been given.
